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YALE  UNIVERSITY  AND OXFORD  UNIVERSITY 
Rethinking  Multiple  Equilibria 
in  Macroeconomic  Modeling 
1. Introduction 
It is a commonplace  that actions  are motivated  by beliefs,  and  so  eco- 
nomic  outcomes  are influenced  by the beliefs  of individuals  in the econ- 
omy.  In many  examples  in  economics,  there  seems  to be  an apparent 
indeterminacy  in  beliefs  in  the  sense  that  one  set  of  beliefs  motivate 
actions  which  bring  about  the  state  of affairs envisaged  in the beliefs, 
while  another set of self-fulfilling  beliefs bring about quite different out- 
comes.  In both  cases,  the beliefs  are logically  coherent,  consistent  with 
the  known  features  of  the  economy,  and  borne  out  by  subsequent 
events.  However,  they  are not  fully  determined  by  the  underlying  de- 
scription of the economy,  leaving  a role for sunspots. 
Models that utilize such apparent indeterminacy  of beliefs have consid- 
erable intuitive  appeal,  since  they provide  a convenient  and economical 
prop in a narrative of unfolding  events.  However,  they are vulnerable  to 
a number  of criticisms.  For a start, the  shift in beliefs  which  underpins 
the switch from one equilibrium to another is left unexplained.  This runs 
counter  to our theoretical  scruples  against  indeterminacy.  More impor- 
tantly, it runs counter  to our intuition  that bad fundamentals  are some- 
how  "more likely" to trigger a financial crisis, or to tip the economy  into 
recession.  In other words,  sunspot  explanations  do not provide  a basis 
for exploring  the  correlation  between  the  underlying  fundamentals  and 
the  resultant  economic  outcomes.  Finally, comparative-statics  analyses 
and the policy implications  that flow from them are only as secure as the 
equilibrium chosen  for this exercise. 
We are grateful  to the editors for their guidance during the preparation  of this paper, and 
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The literature on  multiple  equilibria is large and  diverse.  The recent 
book by Cooper  (1999) provides  a taxonomy  for a selection  of examples 
from  macroeconomics.  Technological  complementarities  (as in  Bryant, 
1983), demand  spillovers  (as in the "big push" model of Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1989), and thick-market externalities  [as in Diamond's  (1982) 
search  model]  are  some  of  the  examples.  Models  of  financial  crises, 
encompassing  both banking  crises and attacks on currency pegs,  have  a 
similarly large and active research following.  Obstfeld  and Rogoff (1997) 
and  Freixas  and  Rochet  (1997)  are  good  stepping-off  points  for  this 
literature. 
Our  objective  in  this  paper  is  to  encourage  a re-examination  of  the 
theoretical basis for multiple  equilibria. We doubt that economic  agents' 
beliefs are as indeterminate  as implied  by the multiple-equilibrium  mod- 
els.  Instead,  the  apparent  indeterminacy  of beliefs  can be  seen  as  the 
consequence  of  two  modeling  assumptions  introduced  to simplify  the 
theory.  First, the  economic  fundamentals  are assumed  to be  common 
knowledge;  and  second,  economic  agents  are  assumed  to  be  certain 
about each other's behavior  in equilibrium.  Both assumptions  are made 
for the sake  of tractability, but they  do much  more besides.  They allow 
agents'  actions  and  beliefs  to  be  perfectly  coordinated  in  a  way  that 
invites  multiplicity  of  equilibria.  We will  describe  an  approach  where 
agents  have  a small amount  of idiosyncratic  uncertainty  about economic 
fundamentals.  Even if this uncertainty  is small,  agents  will be uncertain 
about each other's behavior in equilibrium.  This uncertainty allows  us as 
modelers  to pin  down  which  set  of self-fulfilling  beliefs  will  prevail  in 
equilibrium. 
To elaborate  on this point,  it is instructive  to contrast a single-person 
decision  problem  with  a  game.  In  a  single-person  decision  problem, 
payoffs  are determined  by one's  action and the state of the world.  When 
a decision  maker receives  a message  which  rules out some  states of the 
world,  this  information  can  be  utilized  directly  by  disregarding  those 
states in one's deliberations.  However,  the same is not true in an environ- 
ment  where  payoffs  depend  on the  actions  of other individuals  as well 
as on the  state of the world.  Since my payoff  depends  on your  actions 
and your actions are motivated  by your beliefs,  I care about the range of 
possible  beliefs  you may hold.  So, when  I receive a message  which  rules 
out  some  states  of the world,  it may not be possible  to disregard  those 
states  in  my  deliberations,  since  most  of  them  may  carry information 
concerning  your beliefs.  Even for small disparities  in the information  of 
the  market participants,  uncertainty  about others' beliefs  may dictate  a 
particular  course  of  action  as being  the  uniquely  optimal  one.  In this 
way,  it may  prove  possible  to track the  shifts  in beliefs  as we  track the Rethinking  Multiple  Equilibria  in Macroeconomic  Modeling  ' 141 
shifts in the economic  fundamentals.  There is no longer a choice of what 
beliefs to hold.  One's beliefs are dictated by the knowledge  of the funda- 
mentals  and the knowledge  that other agents  are rational. 
In  this  paper,  we  provide  an  elementary  demonstration  of  why 
adding  noise  to a game  with  multiple  equilibria removes  the multiplic- 
ity. The analysis  builds  on  the  game-theoretic  analysis  of Carlsson  and 
van  Damme  (1993) for two-player  games  and  on the  continuum-player 
application  to currency attacks of Morris and Shin (1998). We develop  a 
very  simple  continuum-player  example  to illustrate  the  argument,  and 
show  by example  why  this is a flexible  modeling  approach  that can be 
applied  to  many  of  the  macroeconomic  models  with  multiplicity  dis- 
cussed  above.  In doing  so,  we  hope  to show  that the indeterminacy  of 
beliefs  in  multiple-equilibrium  models  is  an  artifact of  simplifying  as- 
sumptions  that deliver  more than they  are intended  to deliver,  and that 
the  approach  described  here  is  not  merely  a  technical  curiosity,  but 
represents  a better  way  of understanding  the  role  of self-fulfilling  be- 
liefs in macroeconomics. 
We also outline the principal benefits  of the approach. One is in gener- 
ating comparative  statics, which  in turn aids policy analysis.  The other is 
in  suggesting  observational  implications.  Here  we  summarize  those 
benefits  in a general  way; below,  we  will discuss  them in the context  of 
particular applications. 
Multiple-equilibrium  models  in macroeconomics  are often  used  as a 
starting point  for policy  analysis,  despite  the obvious  difficulties  of any 
comparative-statics  analysis  with  indeterminate  outcomes.  The unique 
equilibrium  in  the  approach  described  here  is characterized  by  a mar- 
ginal decision  maker who,  given  his uncertainty  about others' actions,  is 
indifferent  between  two  actions.  Changing  parameters  in  the  model 
then  delivers  intuitive  comparative-statics  predictions  and implications 
for optimal  policy.  In general,  we  show  that inefficiencies  are unavoid- 
able  in  equilibrium.  The  question  is how  large  such  inefficiencies  are. 
The  answer  turns  on  the  underlying  fundamentals  of the  economy  as 
well  as on the information  structure of the economic  agents.  Thus,  the 
notion  of a solvent but illiquid borrower  can be given  a rigorous  treatment, 
and the extent  of the welfare  losses  associated  with  such  illiquidity  can 
be calculated. 
The theory  offers a different  perspective  on  existing  empirical work. 
One  traditional  approach  in  the  literature  is  to  attempt  to  distinguish 
empirically  between  multiple-equilibrium  models  and  fundamentals- 
driven  models.  These  ultimately  reduce  to  tests  of  whether  observed 
fundamentals  are sufficient  to  explain  outcomes  or whether  there  is  a 
significant  unexplained  component  that  must  be  attributed  to  self- 142 *  MORRIS  & SHIN 
fulfilling  beliefs.  We argue  that correlation  between  fundamentals  and 
outcomes  is  exactly  what  one  should  expect  even  when  self-fulfilling 
beliefs  are playing  an important  role in determining  the  outcome.  One 
will be pessimistic  about  others' beliefs  exactly when  fundamentals  are 
weak.  The standard  sunspot  approach,  by contrast, offers no theoretical 
rationale as to why good outcomes  should be correlated with good funda- 
mentals  (although  admittedly  this is consistent  with  the theory  and of- 
ten assumed). 
We also  suggest  one  distinctive  observational  implication.  Consider 
an environment  where  agents'  actions  are driven by their beliefs  about 
fundamentals  and others' actions.  Suppose  agents  are slightly  uncertain 
about  some  fundamental  variable when  they  make  their decisions,  but 
that ex post  the econometrician  is able to observe  the actual realization 
of that fundamental  variable as well  as some  public signal concerning  it 
that was  available  to agents  at the  time.  The theory  suggests  the  pre- 
diction  that the public  signals  will have  an apparently  disproportionate 
impact  on  outcomes,  even  controlling  for the  realization  of fundamen- 
tals,  precisely  because  it  signals  information  to  agents  about  other 
agents'  equilibrium beliefs. 
We start in the next section by analyzing  a simple  model  of bank runs, 
in the spirit of Diamond  and Dybvig  (1983), to illustrate the approach in 
the  context  of  a  particular  application.  Goldstein  and  Pauzner  (1999) 
have  developed  a richer model; we  abstract from a number of complica- 
tions in order to bring out our methodological  message.  In Section  3, we 
show  how  the insights  are more general  and can be applied  in a variety 
of contexts.  In particular, we  discuss  models  of currency crises and pric- 
ing debt in the presence  of liquidity risk. 
2.  Bank  Runs 
There  are three  dates,  {0,  1,  2}, and  a continuum  of  consumers,  each 
endowed  with  1  unit  of  the  consumption  good.  Consumption  takes 
place  at  either  date  1  or  date  2.  There  is  a  measure  A of  impatient 
consumers  who  derive  utility  only  from consumption  at date  1, and  a 
measure  1 of patient consumers  for whom  consumption  at date  1 and at 
date 2 are perfect substitutes.  The consumers  learn of their types  at date 
1. At date 0, the probability of being  patient or impatient  is proportional 
to the incidence  of the types.  Thus,  there is probability 
A 
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of being  an impatient  consumer,  and complementary  probability of be- 
ing  the  patient  consumer.  All consumers  have  the  log  utility  function, 
and the utility of the impatient  type is 
u (cl) = log cl, 
where  cl is consumption  at date 1, while  the utility of the patient type is 
u (cl +  c2) = log (cl + c2) 
where  c2 is consumption  at date 2. 
The consumers  can either  store the  consumption  good  for consump- 
tion  at a later date,  or deposit  it in  the  bank.  Those  consumers  who 
have  invested  their wealth  in the bank have  a decision  at date  1, after 
learning  of their type.  They  can either  leave  their money  deposited  in 
the bank,  or withdraw  the sum  permitted  in the deposit  contract (to be 
discussed  below).  The bank  can either  hold  the  deposits  in cash  (with 
rate of return  1) or invest  the  money  in  an illiquid  project,  with  gross 
rate of return R >  1 obtainable  at date 2. We assume  that this technol- 
ogy  is  only  available  to  the  bank.  If  proportion  f  of  the  resources 
invested  in  the  illiquid  investment  are withdrawn  at date  1,  then  the 
rate  of  return  is  reduced  to  R  ? e-e,  reflecting  the  costs  of  premature 
liquidation.  Writing r  log R, this rate of return can be written  as e'-e. 
We assume  that 0 <  r <  1. 
2.1 OPTIMAL  CONTRACT 
We proceed  to solve  for the optimal contract in this context.  The aim is to 
maximize  the ex ante expected  utility 
A  1 
u (cl) +  u (c2)  (2.1) 
I+A  1+A 
by choosing  the amount  cl that can be withdrawn  on demand  at date 1. 
We assume  that the bank is required to keep sufficient cash to fund first- 
period  consumption  under  the  optimal  contract.  Thus,  the  first  con- 
straint is 
C2  Ac1  + R  1 +  A,  (2.2)  R 144 - MORRIS  & SHIN 
which  states that the amount held in cash (Acl)  plus the amount  invested 
in the project (c2/R) cannot exceed  the total resources.  The second  is the 
incentive  compatibility  constraint 
u (c)  <u (c2),  (2.3) 
which  states  that patient  consumers  will,  indeed,  choose  to leave  their 
money  in the bank.  Ignoring  the incentive  compatibility  constraint,  we 
obtain cl =  1 and c2 = R. Then, 
u(cl)  =  0 <  r =  u(2), 
so  that the  incentive  compatibility  constraint  is satisfied  strictly. Thus, 
the optimal  deposit  contract stipulates  that any depositor  can withdraw 
the  whole  of  their  1 unit  deposit  at date  1. Because  the  investment  is 
assumed  to be  available  only  to the bank,  such  a contract can only  be 
implemented  through  the  bank.  Under  such  a contract,  it is a weakly 
dominant  action for every  consumer  at date 0 to deposit  their wealth  in 
the bank. At worst,  they will get their money  back at date 1, and possibly 
do better if the consumer  turns out to be a patient  type.  Thus,  at date 0, 
all consumers  deposit  their money  in the bank. 
2.2 THE  COORDINATION  GAME  BETWEEN 
PATIENT  CONSUMERS 
Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983) observed  that,  unfortunately,  the  optimal 
contract gives  rise to multiple  equilibria at date  1. At date  1, the impa- 
tient  consumers  will  clearly  have  a  dominant  strategy  to  withdraw. 
Given  this behavior,  the  patient  consumers  are playing  a coordination 
game.  If a patient consumer  withdraws,  he gets a cash payoff of 1, giving 
utility  of 0 =  u(l).  This payoff  is independent  of the number  of patient 
consumers  who  withdraw.  If a patient  consumer  does  not  withdraw, 
then  the  payoff  depends  on  the  proportion  of patient  consumers  who 
withdraw.  If a proportion  t withdraw,  his cash payoff  to leaving  money 
in  the  bank  is  er-e, which  gives  utility  r  -  e.  Thus,  utility  is  linearly 
decreasing  in the proportion  of patient  consumers  who  withdraw.  If a 
patient  consumer  expects  all other consumers  not to withdraw  (i.e.,  =- 
0),  then  his  utility  from  not  withdrawing  is  r  >  0.  Thus  there  is  an 
equilibrium where  all patient  consumers  conform  to the optimal deposit 
contract and  leave  their money  in the bank.  But if a patient  consumer 
expects  all other patient  consumers  to withdraw  (i.e.,  f  =  1), then  his 
utility  from not withdrawing  is r -  1 <  0. Thus there is also an equilib- 
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2.3 UNCERTAIN  RETURN  AND UNIQUE  EQUILIBRIUM 
Postlewaite  and  Vives  (1987)  and  Chari  and  Jagannathan  (1988) both 
examine  how  bank runs become  a unique  equilibrium when  asymmetric 
information  is  added  to  the  model.  We follow  Goldstein  and  Pauzner 
(1999) in introducing  a small  amount  of uncertainty  concerning  the log 
return r, holding  fixed the deposit  contract described  above. It should  be 
noted  that as soon  as we  depart  from the benchmark  case,  there is no 
guarantee  that the existing  deposit  contract is optimal.  Neither  the port- 
folio choice of the bank nor the amount  that can be withdrawn  at date 1 
need be optimal in the new  context.  The objective here is to examine  the 
equilibrium outcome  and the welfare  losses  that result when  the bench- 
mark contract is imposed  on an environment  with  noisy  signals. 
Suppose  that r is a normal random variable, and that r has mean f and 
precision  a (i.e.,  variance 1/a). We carry forward the assumption  that the 
return is neither  too  small nor too  large-we  assume  that ? lies  in the 
range: 
0<  <1. 
The  depositors  have  access  to  very  precise  information  about  r before 
they make their withdrawal  decisions,  but the information is not perfect. 
Depositor  i observes  the realization  of the signal 
xi =  r +  Ei,  (2.4) 
where  Ei  is normally  distributed  with  mean 0 and precision  3, and inde- 
pendent  across depositors. 
With  the  introduction  of  uncertainty,  we  need  to  be  explicit  about 
what is meant by equilibrium in the bank-run game.  At date 1, depositor 
i not only observes  his type, but also observes his signal x,, and forms the 
updated  belief concerning  the return r and the possible  signals  obtained 
by  other  depositors.  Based  on  this  information,  depositor  i  decides 
whether  to withdraw  or not.  A strategy for a depositor  is a rule of action 
which  prescribes  an action for each realization of the signal.  A profile of 
strategies  (one for each depositor)  is an equilibrium if, conditional  on the 
information  available to depositor  i and given  the strategies  followed  by 
other  depositors,  the  action  prescribed  by  i's  strategy  maximizes  his 
conditional  expected  utility.  Treating such  realization  of  i's  signal  as a 
possible  "type"  of  this  depositor,  we  are  solving  for the  Bayes  Nash 
equilibria of the imperfect-information  game.  To economize  on the state- 
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pected  utility as leaving money  in the bank, then the depositor  prefers to 
leave  money  in the bank.  This assumption  plays  no  substantial  role in 
what  follows. 
Since  both  r and  x  are normally  distributed,  a depositor's  updated 
belief of r upon  observing  signal x is 
ar +  o3x 
P=  (2.5) 
In contrast to the benchmark  case in which  there is no  uncertainty,  the 
introduction  of uncertainty  eliminates  multiplicity  of equilibrium  if pri- 
vate  signals  are sufficiently  accurate.  The  result  depends  on  the  prior 
and posterior  precision  of r. Specifically, let 
M (a  +  1) 
(a +  )  (2.6)  t (a + 20)' 
and write  (P ()  for the standard normal distribution  function.  Our main 
result states  that there is a unique  equilibrium  in this context,  provided 
that y is small enough. 
THEOREM. Provided that y  _  27r, there is a  unique equilibrium. In  this 
equilibrium,  every  patient consumer  withdraws  if and only if p < p*, where  p* is 
the unique solution to 
P  (  Vy  (P* -)). 
In the limit as y tends to zero, p* tends to 2. 
Provided  that  the  depositors'  signals  are precise  enough  (83  is  high 
relative to a), every  depositor  follows  the switching  strategy around the 
critical value  p*. This  critical value  is  obtained  as  the  intersection  of  a 
cumulative  normal distribution  function with  the 45? line,  as depicted  in 
Figure  1.  In the  limiting  case  when  the  noise  becomes  negligible,  the 
curve flattens out and the critical value p* tends  to 0.5. The critical value 
p* then  divides  the  previously  indeterminate  region  [0,  1] around  its 
midpoint. 
Let us sketch the argument  behind  this result. For p* to be an equilib- 
rium  switching  point,  a  depositor  whose  updated  belief  is  exactly  p* 
ought  to be indifferent  between  leaving his money  deposited  in the bank 
and  withdrawing  it.  The  utility  of  withdrawing  is  zero,  and  is  non- 
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Figure 1 SWITCHING  POINT  p* 
1 
../  .  ./'  (X....  (p-r)) 
p*  r 
r-  f  (2.7) 
which  is random and depends  on e, the proportion  of the patient deposi- 
tors that withdraw.  At the  switching  point  p*, the expectation  of r -  f 
conditional  on p* must therefore be zero. The expectation  of r conditional 
on p* is simply  p* itself.  Thus,  consider  the expectation  of e conditional 
on  p*. Since  noise  is  independent  of  the  true  return  r, the  expected 
proportion  of patient  depositors  who  withdraw  is equal to the probabil- 
ity that any particular depositor  withdraws.  And since the hypothesis  is 
that every depositor  follows  the switching  strategy around p*, the proba- 
bility that any particular depositor  withdraws  is given by the probability 
that this depositor's  updated  belief falls below  p*. 
When patient depositor  i has posterior belief Pi, what is the probability 
that  i attaches  to  some  other  depositor  j having  posterior  belief  lower 
than himself?  Figure 2 illustrates the reasoning. 
Conditional  on pi, return r is normal with mean Pi  and precision  a + ,3. 
Since  xj =  r +  j, the  distribution  of Xj  conditional  on  pi is normal with 
mean  p and precision 
1  /3(a  + j3) 
1  1=  _  (2.8) 
+  -  a + 2 
But pj = (af  +  f3xj)/(a +  3), so that the distribution of p|ipi  is as depicted  in 
Figure 2,  and  the  probability  that  pj is less  than  Pi conditional  on  pi is 
given  by the shaded  area. Moreover, 148 *  MORRIS  & SHIN 
Figure  2 BELIEFS  CONDITIONAL  ON Pi 
pjlpi 
xj  I 
Pi 
ar +  13xi 
Pj <  Pi  a <+  P  a  +13 
(2.9) 
so  the  question  of whether  pj is  smaller  than  pi can be  reduced  to  the 
question  of whether  xj is smaller than pi +  (a/3  )(Pi -  f). Hence, 
Prob (pj <  Pi|pi)  =  Prob (  xi <  Pi +  (P -  r)  ) 
(  /  l(a+A)  (  P 
(Pi  )Pi))  =(  2,  1A  + -  (pi 
-  r)-PI 
,8 
'P(  WY(Pi  -  r)).  (2.10) 
So the  shaded  area in Figure 2 can be represented  in terms of the  area 
under a normal density  which  is centered on the ex ante mean r. Figure 3 
illustrates. 
If p* is an equilibrium  switching  point,  the expectation  of r -  f  condi- 
tional on p* must be zero. Since 
E (r -(p*)=  p*-  (V Y(p* -  r)),  (2.11) 
p* must  be  the  point  at which  'P (  y(p  - r))  intersects  the  45? line, 
exactly  as  depicted  in  Figure  1.  Provided  that  y is  small  enough,  the 
slope  of  P (  /  y  (p -  r)) is less than one,  so that there can be at most one 
point  of intersection.  Since the slope  of the cumulative  normal is given 
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Figure 3 DENSITY  y  (7(pi  -  F)) 
PjP  I 
/  \  (V/(Pi-)) 
Pi  r 
by the corresponding  density  function  (which has the maximum value of 
Vy//27  ),  we  can  guarantee  that  there  is  a unique  intersection  point 
provided  that y is less than 27-. All that remains is to show  that if there is 
a unique  symmetric  equilibrium  in switching  strategies,  there can be no 
other equilibrium.  Appendix  A completes  the argument. 
2.4 COMPARATIVE  STATICS  AND POLICY  ANALYSIS 
The uniqueness  of equilibrium makes it possible  to perform secure com- 
parative-statics  analysis.  We will illustrate  this with  a simple  exercise  in 
our example,  where  an early-withdrawal  penalty  t is imposed  on  con- 
sumers who  withdraw  in period  1. 
In order to set a benchmark to measure our results against, consider the 
case with no uncertainty. The log return r is commonly  known,  and there 
is  multiplicity  of  equilibria.  The  introduction  of  the  early-withdrawal 
penalty  has little effect in this case. The only effect is to shift the range of 
returns where multiple equilibria exist from [0, 1] to [log (1 -  t), log (1 -  t) 
+  1]. Without  a theory  guiding  us  as to which  outcome  results  in the 
game,  it is hard to evaluate  the welfare  consequences  of this policy. The 
most we  can say is that when  r is close to 1 [i.e.,  in the marginal interval 
(log (1 -  t) + 1,1)], the tax will remove the multiplicity  of equilibrium, and 
the efficient outcome  that consumers  do not withdraw  will occur for sure. 
When r is slightly less than 0 [i.e.,  in the marginal interval (log (1 -  t), 0)], 
the tax will allow multiple  equilibria. 
In contrast  to  the  lack  of  meaningful  comparative  statics  when  r is 
common  knowledge,  we  can say  much  more  when  r is observed  with 
noise.  In particular, contrast the case with  no uncertainty  with  the case 
in  which  noise  is  negligible  (i.e.  the  limiting  case  where  y ->  0).  The 
theorem  tells us that patient  consumers  will withdraw  if and only if p < 
log (1 -  t) + 1. This allows  us to calculate the incidence  of withdrawals  at 
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parameters, by shifting  the boundary  of the two populations,  not merely 
at extremal parameter values. 
We can also use  this unique  equilibrium  to examine  policy  trade-offs. 
Recall that the  efficient  outcome  at date  1 is for withdrawal  by patient 
consumers  to take place only if r <  0. If noise  concerning  r is very small, 
we achieve this outcome  with very high probability by setting t = 1 -  e-1/2 
[so that log  (1  -  t)  + -  =  0].  But of course  achieving  efficiency  in the 
withdrawal  decision  comes  at the cost of reducing  the value  of the con- 
tract to  consumers.  The  explicit  form  for the  equilibrium  allows  us  to 
calculate the ex ante expected  utility of consumers.  For any given  t, it is 
1/(1 +  A) times 
[A +  P (V/-(log(l  -  t) +  -  r))] log(l  -  t) 
+  r<r  (V/-  (r -  f))VX/  dr, 
log(1-t)+1/2 
while  the revenue  from the penalty  is 
[A +  (  (VY(log  (1 -  t) +  -  r))] t. 
An  increase  in  the  penalty  can  be  welfare-enhancing  for  consumers 
(even  if  they  derive  no  benefit  from  the  tax revenue).  Goldstein  and 
Pauzner  (1999) examine  contracts where  early-withdrawal  penalties  are 
received  by consumers  who  leave  their money  until date 2. This further 
enhances  the desirability of early-withdrawal  penalties from the consum- 
ers' point  of view. 
2.5 OBSERVABLE  IMPLICATIONS 
We have presented  a highly  simplified  model  of bank runs.  Even in this 
model,  though,  we  can start thinking  about  observable  implications  of 
this theory. The main prediction  is that despite  the self-fulfilling  aspect of 
the bank run, each depositor  will withdraw  his money  exactly when  his 
beliefs about the riskiness of bank deposits  crosses some threshold,  imply- 
ing  that the  size  of equilibrium  bank runs will be negatively  correlated 
with returns.  Consider  the incidence  of deposit  withdrawals  as given by 
the equilibrium  value  of e. This incidence  is a random  variable that de- 
pends  on  the  realized  return  r. A  depositor  withdraws  whenever  his 
posterior belief falls below  the critical value p*, which  happens  whenever 
aT +  Bxi 
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Figure  4 PROPORTION  e(r) OF WITHDRAWALS 
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In other words,  a depositor  withdraws  whenever  the  realization  of his 
signal xi falls below  the critical value 
a++p  a 
x*(p*,r)=  P3  -  -r.  (2.12) 
Since xi = r +  ei, the incidence  of withdrawal  is a function of the realized 
return r, and is given  by 
e(r)  =  P (V-\  (x*(p*,r)  -  r)).  (2.13) 
Figure 4 illustrates. 
Clearly, the  incidence  of withdrawal  is high  when  the  return is low. 
Fundamentals  plays  a key explanatory  role. Gorton  (1988) studies  bank 
panics  in  the  U.S.  national-banking  era (1863-1914).  He  interprets  the 
data in the light of the traditional dichotomy  between  fundamentals  and 
sunspots  as a cause  of panics: 
A common view  of panics is that they are random events, perhaps self- 
confirming  equilibria  in settings with multiple equilibria,  caused by shifts in 
the beliefs of agents which are unrelated to the real economy. An alternative 
view makes panics less mysterious. Agents cannot discriminate  between the 
riskiness  of various  banks  because they lack  bank-specific  information.  Aggre- 
gate information  may then be used to assess risk, in which case it can occur 
that all banks may be perceived to be riskier. Consumers then withdraw 
enough  to cause  a panic  ....  [This latter] hypothesis  links  panics  to occur- 
rences of threshold value of some variable depicting the riskiness of bank 
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He concludes  that the latter theory performs  well.  The highly  simpli- 
fied model  of bank runs presented  here suggests  a reinterpretation  of the 
evidence.  The  theory  suggests  that  depositors  will  indeed  withdraw 
their money  when  the perceived  riskiness of deposits  crosses a threshold 
value.  But nonetheless,  the banking  panic  is self-fulfilling  in the  sense 
that individual  investors  only withdraw  because  they expect others to do 
so.  The  theory  suggests  both  that banking  panics  are correlated  with 
poor  fundamentals  and  that  inefficient  self-fulfilling  panics  occur.  Of 
course,  it is possible  to  make  assumptions  about  sunspots  that mimic 
these  predictions;  but  the  theory  presented  here  places  tighter  restric- 
tions  on outcomes  than sunspot  theory. 
One  would  like  to  come  up  with  distinctive  implications  that  are 
harder to mimic with judiciously  chosen  sunspots.  We will suggest  one 
example  in  this  bank-deposit  context.  Suppose  that  we  were  able  to 
observe  both  the  prior  mean  of  the  log  return  f  and  the  realized  log 
return  r; the  prior  mean  f  is  a public  signal  that  is  observable  by  all 
depositors  when  they  make  their  withdrawal  decisions.  Our  theory 
predicts  that  for any  given  level  of  fundamentals  r, the  proportion  of 
consumers  running  would  be decreasing  in F.  This is apparent from our 
theorem,  since a fall in the ex ante mean F  shifts the curve  P (V  ~(p  -  r)) 
to the  left,  so  that its intersection  with  the 45? degree  line  is shifted  to 
the  right.  Figure  5 illustrates  this  shift.  Thus,  when  the  fundamentals 
are commonly  known  to be weak  (i.e.  F  is low),  the equilibrium  strategy 
dictates  much  more  aggressive  withdrawals,  even  controlling  for one's 
posterior belief about r. 
A prediction  of the model,  then,  would  be that if we  could divide  the 
fundamentals  variables  in Gorton's  analysis  into  those  that were  most 
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readily  available to depositors  contemporaneously  and those  that were 
not,  we  should  expect  the  most  readily  available  variables  to have  the 
biggest  effect.  We will  come  across  another  instance  of  the  impact  of 
public information below. 
3.  Complementarities  and  Macroeconomics 
The example  above was constructed  around a simple  coordination  game 
played  by a continuum  of players.  Much of the macroeconomics  litera- 
ture  on  complementarities,  multiple  equilibria,  and  sunspots  similarly 
reduces  in the end  to coordination  games  played  by large populations. 
In this  section,  we  illustrate  how  other  issues  can be  addressed  using 
similar methods. 
Consider  the following  class of problems.  A continuum  of individuals 
must  choose  between  a safe  action and  a risky action.  If an individual 
chooses  the safe action,  his payoff  is a constant.  If he chooses  the risky 
action, his payoff is an increasing function of the "state of fundamentals" 
r but  a decreasing  function  of  the  proportion  of  the  population  who 
choose  the safe action, e. In the bank-run example  above,  the payoff was 
linear in both r and e. This linearity allowed  us to give  simple  character- 
izations  of the equilibrium.  But as long as the payoff to the risky action is 
increasing  in r and decreasing  in e, there will be a unique  equilibrium of 
the type  described  above  when  information  is sufficiently  accurate. We 
will give an informal description  of two applications  that fit this general 
setup  that we have  analyzed  elsewhere. 
3.1 CURRENCY  CRISES 
A continuum  of speculators  must  decide  whether  to attack a fixed  ex- 
change  rate.  The  cost  to the  monetary  authority  of defending  the  peg 
depends  on  the  fundamentals  of  the  economy  and  the  proportion  of 
speculators  who  attack the currency. If the monetary  authority has some 
fixed benefit  of maintaining  the peg,  then  for each realization  of funda- 
mentals,  there  will  be  some  critical mass  of  speculators  sufficient  to 
induce  abandonment  of the  currency. If the  peg  is abandoned,  the ex- 
change rate will float to some level that depends  on the fundamentals.  A 
speculator  may  choose  to  attack by  selling  a fixed  amount  of the  cur- 
rency short. If he attacks, he must pay a transaction cost but receives  the 
difference between  the peg and the floating rate if the attack is successful 
and there is a devaluation. 
This stylized  model is in the spirit of the self-fulfilling-attacks  literature 
(see, for example,  Obstfeld,  1996). If the state of fundamentals  is common 
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mentals  are sufficiently  low, devaluation  is guaranteed.  If fundamentals 
are sufficiently high, there will be no devaluation.  But for some intermedi- 
ate range of fundamentals,  there are multiple  equilibria. Morris and Shin 
(1998) show how if there is a small amount of noise concerning  fundamen- 
tals, there is a unique  equilibrium. 
Now  consider  a policy that makes it harder for an attack to be success- 
ful. For example,  the monetary  authority  might  accumulate  reserves.  A 
naive calculation of the value of those reserves  might involve  calculating 
the  likelihood  of  contingencies  in  which  those  extra  reserves  would 
make the difference  in the authority's  ability to defend  against an attack. 
This  is  analogous  to  seeing  when  a  tax  on  early  withdrawals  would 
remove  the  existence  of  a  withdrawal  equilibrium  in  the  bank-run 
model.  But taking  into  account  the  strategic  analysis,  we  see  that  the 
true benefit  of  accumulating  reserves  is as a confidence-building  mea- 
sure.  If the  accumulation  of reserves  is publicly  observed,  speculators 
will anticipate  that other speculators  will be less  aggressive  in attacking 
the currency. So in regions  of fundamentals  where  a self-fulfilling  attack 
is in fact feasible,  it will not occur. 
The  theory  also  generates  intuitive  predictions  about  which  events 
lead  to currency  attacks.  Deteriorating  fundamentals,  even  if observed 
by  most  participants,  will  have  less  effect  if the  fact that fundamentals 
are deteriorating  is  not  common  knowledge.  Very public  signals  that 
fundamentals  have  deteriorated  only  a small  amount  may have  a large 
impact.  This  is  because  a  speculator  observing  a bad  signal  not  only 
anticipates  that the monetary  authority  will have  a harder time defend- 
ing against  an attack, but also  anticipates  that other speculators  will be 
attacking.  This  explanation  is  quite  commonplace.  But the  theoretical 
model  that we have  described  captures this argument  exactly. 
3.2 PRICING  DEBT 
Our  methods  may  also  help  us  to  understand  some  of  the  anomalies 
noted  in the empirical literature on the pricing of defaultable  debt.  One 
influential  approach has been  to note that a lender's  payoff is analogous 
to the payoff that arises from holding  a short position  in a put option  on 
the  borrower's  assets.  Hence,  option-pricing  techniques  can  be  em- 
ployed  to price  debt,  as shown  in the  classic  paper  by  Merton  (1974). 
Nevertheless,  the  empirical  success  of  this  approach  has  been  mixed, 
with  the usual  discrepancy  appearing  in the form of the overpricing  (by 
the theory)  of the debt,  and especially  of the lower-quality,  riskier debt. 
The  anomaly  would  be  explained  if it can be  shown  that  the  default 
trigger for asset values  actually shifts as the underlying  asset changes  in 
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The  incidence  of  inefficient  liquidation  seen  in  our bank-run  example 
suggests  that similar inefficiencies  might  arise in the coordination  prob- 
lem between  creditors facing a distressed  borrower. This would  give us a 
theory of solvent but illiquid  borrowers,  enabling us to address the empiri- 
cal anomalies.  This is attempted  in Morris and Shin (1999). 
When  the fundamentals  are bad,  coordination  to keep  a solvent  bor- 
rower afloat is more difficult to achieve,  and the probability of inefficient 
liquidation  is large.  This is another  manifestation  of the  importance  of 
public  information  in achieving  coordination  alluded  to in the previous 
section.  The disproportionate  impact of public information  can be illus- 
trated in the following  example  of a borrower in distress. 
Consider  a group  of lenders  who  are funding  a project.  Time is dis- 
crete,  and  advances  by  increments  of  A >  0.  The fundamentals  of the 
project at date  t are captured by the random  variable rt. Conditional  on 
its current realization,  the next realization  of rt is i.i.d.,  normally distrib- 
uted  around  its current realization,  with  variance  A. In other words,  {rt} 
is a sequence  of snapshots  of a simple  Brownian motion  at time intervals 
of A. To economize  on notation,  we  denote  by r the current value  of the 
fundamentals,  and by r, its value in the next period.  At each date, every 
lender  chooses  whether  or not  to  continue  funding  the  project.  The 
project fails if and only if 
e >  r, 
where  e  is  the  proportion  of  creditors  who  pull  out  of  the  project. 
Hence,  when  r >  1 the project is viable irrespective  of the actions of the 
creditors.  If r  <  0,  the  project  fails  irrespective  of  the  actions  of  the 
creditors.  However,  when  r lies between  0 and 1, the fate of the project 
depends  on  how  severe  the  creditor  run  is.  At  each  date,  a  lender 
receives  a payment  of  1 if the  project has  survived.  When  the  project 
fails,  a lender  receives  zero.  By pulling  out,  a lender  receives  an inter- 
mediate  payoff  A, where  0  <  A <  1.  We also  suppose  that  a creditor 
who  withdraws  when  the project is still viable rejoins the project in the 
next  period  (having  missed  a single  payment  of  1).  This  assumption 
ensures  that the creditors face a sequence  of one-shot  games. 
None  of  the  creditors  observe  the  current  fundamentals  perfectly. 
Each has signal 
xi  =  r  +  Ei, 
where  Ei  and  ej are independent  for i  j, and  Ei  is normal with  mean  0 
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underlying  uncertainty. The lenders,  however,  observe the previous  real- 
ization  of r perfectly. This will serve  as the public information  on which 
much  of the analysis  will hinge.  As  the time interval  A becomes  small, 
the noise  disappears  at a faster rate than the overall uncertainty  govern- 
ing  r. Each lender  chooses  an action based  on the realized  signal  x and 
the (commonly  known)  previous  realization  of r. 
This game has a unique equilibrium  (the proof if sketched  in Appendix 
B) in  which  there  is  a critical value  of  fundamentals  r* for which  the 
project fails next period whenever  r+ <  r*. We call r  the collapse  point for 
the project. It is given  by the (unique)  solution  to 
r  =  (r  r +  P-(A)V  1+  ).  (3.1) 
The collapse  point  is obtained  as the  intersection  between  the  45? line 
and the distribution  function for a normal with unit variance centered on 
r -  0-1(A)V  1 +A  . The following  points  are worthy  of note. 
1. r* is a function  of the current realization  r. Hence,  public information 
plays a crucial role in determining  the trigger point for collapse. 
2. The continuous  time limit as A -> 0 is well  defined. 
3. r* is a decreasing  function  of r. So, when  fundamentals  deteriorate,  the  +  I 
probability  of  collapse  increases  not  only  because  the  fundamentals 
are worse,  but also because  the trigger point has moved  unfavorably. 
This last feature is possibly  quite significant.  For an asset whose  funda- 
mentals  are bad  (i.e.,  r is low),  the probability  of default is higher  than 
would  be the case in the absence of coordination  problems  among  credi- 
tors.  Such  a pattern  would  explain  why  one  would  misprice  such  an 
asset in a model  that assumes  a fixed default point.  The mispricing  takes 
the form of overpricing  the riskier bonds-exactly  the empirical anomaly 
discussed  in the literature. 
There  is  a more  general  lesson.  The  onset  of  financial  crises  can be 
very  rapid,  and many  commentators  note  how  the severity  of a crisis is 
disproportionate  to  the  deteriorating  fundamentals.  In  our  account, 
such  apparently  disproportionate  reactions  arise as an essential  feature 
of the model.  When  fundamentals  deteriorate,  coordination  is less  easy 
to achieve.  We can explore this effect further by examining  the compara- 
tive statics of the probability of collapse.  The probability of collapse next 
period  conditional  on the current fundamentals  r is 
( r  -  r 
vz)' 
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As r falls, the probability of collapse  increases  at the rate 
x/X(1  -  O) 
where  4)  is the standard normal density  at (r* -  r)/\fA.  The increase in 
the probability  of collapse  can be quite large when  r hovers  close  to the 
collapse  point,  and  the  onset  of  failure  can  thus  be  quite  rapid.  As 
compared  to  the  naive  model  which  does  not  take  into  account  the 
dependence  of the  collapse  point  on  the  current fundamentals,  this  is 
larger by a factor of 1/ (1 -  ).  When  r is close  to the collapse  point  r*, 
this is roughly  /2-/(\/27-  -  1) -  1.66. 
The inverse  relationship  between  the  current value  of fundamentals 
and the collapse  point is suggestive  of the precipitous  falls in the price of 
defaultable  securities  during financial crises. 
The continuous  time limit of the model makes possible  further simplifi- 
cations  in the  analysis.  Taking the  limit  as  A --  0,  the  fundamentals  r 
evolve  as a simple  Brownian  motion,  and  the  collapse  point  r* for the 
next period converges  to the collapse  point in the current period.  So (3.1) 
can be written 
r* =  (r* -  r  +  -1(A)) 
Collapse  occurs when  r hits r*, i.e.  at r* =  A. 
3.3 HOW SPECIAL  IS THE  ANALYSIS? 
In this paper, we have described stylized  examples  with normally distrib- 
uted  states  and  signals,  binary  choices  by  a symmetric  continuum  of 
players,  and payoffs  linear in the state and proportion  of players  choos- 
ing each action. These assumptions  allowed  us to give simple character- 
izations  of  the  unique  equilibrium.  However,  the  analysis  is  arguably 
quite general.  If one is only interested  in the limiting case where noise  in 
signals  is very  small,  the exact shape  of the noise  or prior beliefs  about 
the  state  do  not  matter.  Asymmetries  among  the  players  can  also  be 
incorporated.  Corsetti  et al. (1999) examine  the role of a large trader in 
currency markets in an asymmetric  game.  The qualitative features of the 
analysis  are very  similar  between  continuum  and  finite  player  cases. 
Indeed,  in the special  case of the payoffs  in the bank-run model,  where 
only  the  proportion  of other players  choosing  each  action matters,  the 
analysis  is  literally  unchanged.  That is,  if we  had  a finite  number  of 
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patient,  the unique  equilibrium would  have patient consumers  using  the 
same  cutoff  point  for withdrawals.  Dealing  with  many  actions  is more 
delicate  (see Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner, 2000), although  the analysis 
extends  straightforwardly  in  some  instances.  Carlsson  and  Ganslandt 
(1998) describe  what  happens  when  noise  is  added  to  Byrant's  (1983) 
model  of technological  complementarities. 
4.  Concluding  Remarks 
We draw  two  conclusions  from  our  analysis.  The  first is  that  applied 
theorists  should  be  wary  of  selecting  an  arbitrary outcome  for further 
attention when  conducting  comparative-statics  exercises  and in drawing 
policy  implications.  The mere fact that an outcome  is Pareto-superior  to 
another  is no good  reason  for it to be selected,  and we  should  expect  to 
see  some  inefficiencies  as  a rule.  The notion  of  a "solvent  but  illiquid 
bank" can be given  a rigorous  treatment,  and we  hope  that our discus- 
sions  can contribute  to policy  debates  in the area. 
Our second  conclusion  is a methodological  one.  Contrary to the  im- 
pression  given  by  multiple-equilibrium  models  of the  apparent  auton- 
omy of beliefs to float freely over the fundamentals,  we believe  that such 
autonomy  of beliefs  is largely illusory  when  information  is modeled  in a 
more realistic way. No doubt some  researchers may find this regrettable, 
since  one  degree  of freedom  is lost in the exercise  of providing  a narra- 
tive of unfolding  events.  However,  there are compensations  for this loss, 
and we  hope  that these  benefits  will be recognized  by researchers.  One 
promising  line of inquiry  is to explore  the correlations between  the un- 
derlying  fundamentals  and  the  degree  of  optimism  of  the  economic 
agents.  Empirical investigations  will then have  a much firmer basis. 
Appendix  A 
When  there  is a unique  symmetric  equilibrium  in switching  strategies, 
there  can be  no  other  equilibrium.  An  argument  is sketched  here.  De- 
note by u (p,p) the expected  utility from leaving  one's money  in the bank 
conditional  on  posterior  p when  all other  patient  depositors  follow  a 
switching  strategy  around  p. Conditional  on p, the expected  proportion 
of depositors  who  withdraw  is given by the probability that any particu- 
lar depositor  receives  a signal  lower  than  the  critical value  p. From the 
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(<a+2 
P+  (  )  p))  -  (v  (P  +  (p  -P)))  (A.1) 
Hence,  u (p,p) is given by 
u (p,^)  =  p -  p  (  /  (  ^-F  +  (  -  ) ))  (A.2) 
If r is negative,  the  utility  from withdrawing  is higher  than  that from 
leaving  money  in  the  bank,  irrespective  of  what  the  other  depositors 
decide.  So, if the posterior belief p is sufficiently  unfavorable,  withdraw- 
ing  is a dominant  action.  Let pi be the threshold  value  of the belief  for 
which  withdrawal  is  the  dominant  action.  Any  belief  p <  p1 will  then 
dictate that a depositor  withdraws.  Both depositors  realize this, and each 
rules out strategies  of the other depositor  which leave money  in the bank 
for signals  lower than p1. But then,  leaving  money  in the bank cannot be 
optimal if one's  signal is lower than P2,  where  P2  solves 
u (P2,P1) =  0.  (A.3) 
This is so because the switching  strategy around P2  is the best reply to the 
switching  strategy  around  pf, and  even  the  most  optimistic  depositor 
believes  that the incidence  of withdrawals  is higher than that implied by 
the  switching  strategy  around  pl.  Since  the  payoff  to  withdrawing  is 
increasing  in the  incidence  of withdrawal  by the  other  depositors,  any 
strategy that leaves  money  in the bank for signals  lower than P2  is domi- 
nated.  Thus,  after two rounds  of deletion  of dominated  strategies,  any 
strategy  that leaves  money  in the bank for signals  lower  than P2  is elimi- 
nated.  Proceeding  in this way, one generates  the increasing  sequence 
P1 <  P2 <  '..  <  Pk  <  '  ,  (A.4) 
where  any strategy that leaves  money  in the bank for a signal p <  ,k does 
not survive  k rounds  of deletion  of dominated  strategies.  This sequence 
is increasing,  since  u (,  ) is increasing  in its first argument  and decreas- 
ing in its second.  The smallest  solution  p to the equation  u (p,p) = 0 is the 
least  upper  bound  of this  sequence,  and  hence  its limit.  Any  strategy 
that leaves  money  in the bank for signal  lower  than p does  not survive 
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Conversely,  if  p is  the  largest  solution  to  u  (p,p)  =  0,  there  is  an 
exactly  analogous  argument  from  "above,"  which  demonstrates  that  a 
strategy  that withdraws  for signals  larger than  p does  not  survive  iter- 
ated dominance.  But if there is a unique solution  to u (p,p) = 0, then  the 
smallest  solution  just  is  the  largest  solution.  There  is  precisely  one 
strategy remaining  after eliminating  all iteratively  dominated  strategies. 
Needless  to  say,  this  also  implies  that this  strategy  is  the  only  equilib- 
rium strategy. 
Appendix  B 
The posterior belief of the current value  of r is normal with  mean 
xi +  Ar_ 
1+A 
and precision  (1 +  A)/A2,  where  r_ denotes  the previous  realization  of r. 
Denote  by U(p) the payoff to continuing  with the project conditional  on p 
when  all creditors  are following  the  p-switching  strategy. It is given  by 
U(p) =  q)(  v 
p),  (B.1) 
where  r* is the  trigger value  of fundamentals  at which  the  project col- 
lapses.  r* satisfies  r* =  f.  But if other speculators  follow  the p-switching 
strategy, f  is the proportion  of creditors whose  signal  is lower  than  the 
marginal value  of x that implies  the switching  posterior  p. This gives 
/  P~\pr*\ 
r*(  p -  r  +?  .  (B.2) 
From these  two  equations,  we  can show  by implicit  differentiation  that 
U'(p) >  0. There is a unique  solution  to U(p) = A, and the equilibrium is 
unique  for the  same  reasons  as  cited  for the  main  theorem.  To solve 
explicitly  for the collapse  point  r*, we  solve  the pair of equations  given 
by (B.2) and  U(p) =  A. This gives 
r* =  ((  -  r- +  )-  (A)/  +  ), 
as required. Rethinking  Multiple Equilibria  in Macroeconomic  Modeling * 161 
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Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Minneapolis  and University  of Minnesota 
1. Introduction 
Macroeconomists  have used coordination  games with multiple equilibria 
to describe  any number  of phenomena  in which  we  appear to see  large 
changes  in economic  outcomes  with  little or no  apparent  change  in the 
underlying  economic  fundamentals.  Usually,  in macroeconomic  applica- 
tions,  these  games  are shown  to have  multiple  equilibria and the argu- 
ment  is made  that large changes  in economic  outcomes  can follow  from 
changes  in agents'  expectations  about what  other agents  will  do rather 
than from changes  in economic  fundamentals  alone. 
Morris and Shin present  a simple  and dramatic insight  into the struc- 
ture of simple  coordination  games.  With only  a few  assumptions,  they 
show that if agents see a noisy signal of the true state of the world and thus 
have some uncertainty about the exact structure of the coordination  game 
that they are playing  as well  as some  uncertainty about what every other 
agents  knows  about  the  coordination  game  that they  are playing,  then 
these  games  in  fact have  a unique  equilibrium  corresponding  to  each 
underlying  state of the world.  This result suggest  that macroeconomists 
should  reassess  whether  their previous  findings  of multiple  equilibria in 
these  coordination  games  are robust to small changes  in the structure of 
information  available to agents. 
Morris and  Shin  go  on  to show  that if the  noise  introduced  into  the 
coordination  game is small, the selected  equilibrium  has the feature that 
there is a threshold  state of the world  around which  the economic  out- 
come  changes  very rapidly with  small changes  in the state, while  in the 
other regions  of the state space,  the economic  outcome  is quite stable as 
the  underlying  state  of  the  world  varies.  This  second  feature  of  the 
equilibrium  selected  by Morris and Shin's  apparatus  suggests  that their 
work  may  be  more  than  a  criticism  of  the  robustness  of  previous 
multiple-equilibrium  literature and may, in fact, have important implica- 
tions  for a number  of applications. 
My discussion  of this paper by Morris and Shin has four parts. First, I 
present  what I think is the simplest  environment  in which  to apply their 
apparatus.  Second,  I go over a proof  of their result in this environment 
that is slightly  different than the proof presented  in the paper. I hope that 
it will help any reader interested  in understanding  the logic of Morris and 
Shin's results to see the argument from a different angle. Third, I describe Comment 163 
what  I find to be the most  interesting  feature  of the equilibrium  that is 
selected  and also go over an example  of how  one might use this technol- 
ogy to do comparative statics. Fourth, I describe what I believe is the main 
impediment  to  use  of  this  technology  for  modeling  macroeconomic 
phenomena. 
To jump  ahead  for a moment,  this fourth and final part of my discus- 
sion does  not focus  on the applied  question  of whether  the models  that 
Morris and  Shin  have  proposed  for currency  crises  and  the  pricing  of 
corporate debt in related papers are relevant for analyzing  those phenom- 
ena.  Instead  I focus  on the broader  question  of whether  one  can intro- 
duce  markets  and  prices,  clearly essential  parts of any macroeconomic 
application,  into what,  to date, has been  a purely  game-theoretic  analy- 
sis. Morris and Shin, in their introduction,  criticize previous  applications 
of  coordination  games  in  macroeconomics  for relying  on  assumptions 
that  "allow  agents'  actions  and beliefs  to be  perfectly  coordinated  in a 
way that invites multiplicity  of equilibria." The noise  that they introduce 
into  coordination  games  has  the  effect  of  preventing  coordination  of 
agents'  actions  and beliefs.  In a market economy,  however,  prices serve 
precisely  to coordinate  actions  (so that supply  equals demand),  and in a 
dynamic  market economy,  asset prices play an important  role in coordi- 
nating  agents'  beliefs,  since  these  prices  tend  to aggregate  information 
across individuals. 
It is not clear to me how  the argument  presented  by Morris and Shin 
would  carry over  to  a  model  with  markets.  Their  arguments  require 
agents  to have  diverse  beliefs  about the probabilities  of future outcomes 
in equilibrium,  and  this  typically  does  not  happen  in models  in which 
agents see the market signals about those probabilities embodied  in asset 
prices.  The  nature  of  this  difficulty  in  translating  Morris  and  Shin's 
technology  to  a market  environment  should  become  clearer  after we 
review  the details of how  this technology  works. 
2. A Simple  Coordination  Game 
Let us review  how  Morris and Shin's technology  works in the context of 
what  seems  a natural application  of the game  theory. Consider  a crowd 
that faces riot police  in the street.  Individuals  in the crowd  must  decide 
whether  to  riot or not.  If enough  people  riot,  the  riot police  are over- 
whelmed,  and each rioter gets loot W >  0. If too few people  riot, the riot 
police  contain  the riot, and each rioter gets  arrested  with  payoff  L <  0. 
Individuals  who  choose  not to riot leave the crowd and get safe payoff 0. 
The strength  of the riot police  depends  on the state of the world,  0, and 
the strictly increasing  function a(0) indexes  the fraction of the crowd that 164 *  ATKESON 
must  riot to overwhelm  the police.  Let 0 denote  the point  at which  a(0) 
crosses  0, and  0 the point  at which  a(O)  crosses  1. 
The equilibria of this game when  the state 0 is common  knowledge  are 
as follows.  If 0  0_,  then  it is a dominant  strategy  for each individual  to 
riot, since  the  riot police  in this case are so weak  that they  cannot  stop 
even  a single  rioter  [a(0) -  0].  Thus,  if  0 is  in  this  region  of the  state 
space,  everyone  riots and  gets  payoff  W for sure.  If 0 >  0,  then  it is a 
dominant  strategy  for each  individual  not  to  riot,  since  the  police  can 
contain  the crowd  even  if everyone  riots [a(0) >  1]. Thus,  if 0 is in this 
region  of  the  state  space,  no  one  riots  and  everyone  gets  payoff  0 for 
sure.  In the  middle  of the  state  space,  with  0 <  0 c  0,  there  are two 
possible  equilibria corresponding  to each value  of the state 0. In the first 
of these  equilibria, everybody  riots. In this case, the fraction of the crowd 
that riots is 1 -  a(0), so the police  are overwhelmed  and everybody  gets 
payoff  W > 0. In the second  of these equilibria, nobody  riots. In this case 
the fraction of the crowd  that riots is 0 <  a(O), so the police  contain  the 
crowd  and  any  individual  who  riots is arrested.  Hence,  nobody  riots, 
and everybody  in the crowd  gets  0 >  L. This game  clearly has multiple 
equilibria in a region of the state space,  and when  the state variable is in 
this  region,  the  economic  outcome  depends  on  agents'  expectations  of 
what  other  agents  will  do  and  not  on  the  underlying  economic  funda- 
mental a(0). 
3. An Alternative  Presentation  of the  Proof  of Their  Result 
Morris and Shin introduce  the following  changes  into this coordination 
game.  They assume  that individuals  do not know  the state of the world, 
0. Instead,  each individual  starts with  a common  prior that 0 is normally 
distributed with some mean mo  and variance 1/a (precision  a). (I think of 
the  randomness  in  0  as  arising  from  the  problem  that  the  precise 
strength  of the  squad  of riot police  available to any particular crowd  in 
any  particular  street  at  any  particular  time  depends  somewhat  on 
chance.)  Each  individual  in  the  crowd  then  receives  an  idiosyncratic 
signal  xi  =  0  +  ei of  the  state  0,  where  Ei is  normally  distributed  with 
mean  0 and  variance  1/13  (precision  3) and  is i.i.d.  across  individuals. 
Given these  assumptions,  we have two distributions  that play a key role 
in the analysis.  First is the distribution  of signals  xi across agents  condi- 
tional on the realization  of the state 0. With the assumptions  above,  this 
is a normal  distribution,  but  we  can write  it more  generally  as a c.d.f. 
Prob(x c  x*10),  which  we  will  assume  to be a strictly positive,  continu- 
ous,  decreasing  function  of 0 for any value  of x*. Second  is the posterior 
distribution  over  0 for an agent  who  has  seen  signal  x. This is obtained Comment 165 
from Bayes's rule and,  under  the assumptions  above,  is a normal distri- 
bution; but it can also be written more generally as a c.d.f.  Prob(0 -  0*Ix). 
We also assume  that this is a continuous  and decreasing  function  of x for 
any value  of 0*. 
Morris and Shin's result in the context of this simple  game can then be 
stated  as follows.  Assume  that there  is a unique  solution  x*, 0* to the 
following  two equations: 
Prob(x 
-  xl 0) = a(0*),  (1) 
Prob(0 c  0O*x*)W  +  [1 -  Prob(0 -  0*Ix*)]L  = 0.  (2) 
Then there is unique  equilibrium described by x* and 0*. The signal x* is 
a threshold  signal  such  that all individuals  who  get  signals  x -  x* riot, 
and those  who  get signal  x >  x* do not riot. The state  0* is a threshold 
state  such  that  the  crowd  overwhelms  the  police,  so  that  rioters  get 
payoff  W if  0 <  0* and  the  police  contain  the  crowd,  and  rioters  are 
arrested and get payoff  L if 0 >  0*. 
In the paper,  Morris and Shin make  assumptions  on the precision  of 
the  signal  relative  to the  precision  of the  prior in stating  the  result.  In 
proving  their proposition  they  show  that there is a unique  solution  to 
the analogues  to equations  (1) and (2) if we  assume  that the precision  of 
the signal,  denoted  3, is sufficiently  high  relative to the precision  of the 
prior, denoted  a,  and the slope  of the function  a(0). The necessary  and 
sufficient  condition  for their  result,  however,  appears  to be  that these 
two equations  have  a unique  solution. 
One way to prove this proposition  is by iterated deletion  of dominated 
strategies.  I find this proof the easiest  to understand.  It goes  as follows. 
First observe  that individuals  who  get  sufficiently  low  and high  sig- 
nals,  which  I denote  x0 for the low  signal  and x? for the high  signal,  are 
so confident  of their posterior beliefs  that 0 -  0 or 0 >  0, that they find 
it  a  dominant  strategy  to  riot  or  not  riot,  respectively,  regardless  of 
what  everyone  else  does.  The  low  signal  x0 is  the  highest  value  of  x 
such that 
Prob(0  -  O0x)W  + Prob(0 > Olx)L  - 0. 
The interpretation  here is that, even  if one believed  that everyone  else in 
the crowd was not going  to riot, and thus any individual  rioter would  be 
arrested in the event  that 0 >  0, the posterior probability  that 0 -  0 for 
someone  who  saw  x -  x0 is high  enough  to make it worthwhile  to run 
the risk of rioting. 
Analogous  reasoning  defines  x?. Even  with  the  belief  that everyone 166  *  ATKESON 
else always riots and thus that rioters  will get W if 0  - 0, someone who 
saw signal x > x?,  where x?  is the smallest x such that 
Prob(O6 OIx)W  + Prob(0  >  O\x)L  < 0, 
would not find the potential reward of rioting likely enough to justify 
the risk. These two observations give us the first round of deletion of 
dominated strategies:  any equilibrium  strategy  must have all agents with 
signals x < x0  rioting and those with signals x > x?  not rioting, because, 
for agents with such signals, rioting and not rioting are optimal strate- 
gies regardless of what everyone else does. 
In the subsequent rounds of our iterated  deletion of dominated strate- 
gies, we take as given the restriction  on dominated strategies obtained 
from the previous round. That is,  any individual contemplating the 
actions of others must believe that everyone who has signals x -  x0  will 
riot and no one who has signals x >  x? will riot. If everyone who has 
signals  x <  x0 riots,  then  the  fraction of the  crowd  that riots in state  0 
must be at least Prob(x  -  x0O0).  Given our assumptions on this c.d.f., this 
fraction of rioters is always positive and is a continuous and declining 
function of  0. Thus, there is a maximum value of the state, which I 
denote  00 >  0, such that 
Prob(x -  xol0) - a(O). 
Accordingly,  a rational  individual must realize that at least in all states of 
nature 0 -  00,  enough of the crowd will riot  to overwhelm the police, and 
such an individual thus finds it a dominant strategy to riot as long as his 
signal x < xl, where xl is the largest signal x such that 
Prob(0 -  0O0x)W  + Prob(0 >  0o0x)L  >  0. 
Likewise, each agent realizes that at least a fraction Prob(x > x?|0)  of 
the crowd will not riot in state 0, and thus the rioters must lose and be 
arrested in all states greater than or equal to 0%,  where 0? <  0 is the 
maximum  value of 0 such that 
Prob(x -- x?0O)  >  a(O). 
Accordingly, it is a dominant strategy for a rational agent not to riot 
when his signal exceeds x', where xl is the smallest x such that 
Prob(O  -  00?x)W  + Prob(O  >  0?1x)L  c  0. Comment*  167 
With  these  observations  we  iteratively  delete  dominated  strategies: 
given  x0 and  x? as  threshold  signals  below  which  everyone  riots  and 
above which  no one riots, we have shown  that any equilibrium  strategy 
must have  the crowd  winning  at least in states  0 -  00  and losing  at least 
in states  0 >  0?, and thus  rational agents  should  riot when  their signals 
x  c  xl  and  not  riot when  their  signals  x  >  x1. These  new  threshold 
signals  xl and  xl then  take the  place  of x0 and  x? as restrictions  on  the 
behavior  of  every  other  agent,  and  we  go  through  these  calculations 
again,  deriving  new  restrictions on the equilibrium  strategies. 
This  iterative  procedure  of  restricting  the  equilibrium  strategies  de- 
fines  increasing  sequences  {xn, 0Jn)0  and decreasing  sequences  {xn, 0"}," 
that  progressively  put  tighter  and  tighter  bounds  on  the  equilibrium 
strategies.  To finish  the  proof  of  Morris  and  Shin's  proposition,  we 
need  only  show  that these  sequences  converge  to common  limit points, 
which  I will  denote  x* and  0*.  Showing  this  proves  the  proposition 
because  it forces  the conclusion  that all agents  with  signals  x -  x* riot, 
while  no  agents  with  signals  x >  x* riot,  and  that the  crowd  wins  the 
riot in all states  0 < 0*, and loses  in all states  0 >  0*. 
To show  that  the  sequences  above  have  common  limit  points,  we 
observe  that any limit points  x* and  0* of either of these  two  sequences 
must  be  a solution  to  the  two  equations  (1) and  (2). But,  if these  two 
equations  have a unique  solution,  then we are done,  since that forces the 
conclusion  that these  two sequences  have  a common  limit point. 
The algebra behind  Morris and Shin's result that equations  (1) and (2) 
have a unique  solution  when  the signals x are precise relative to the prior 
is straightforward.  To do the algebra under the assumption  of normality, 
observe  that the term 
Prob(x  x*1*)  =  P (Vf(x*  -  0*)) 
where  5 is a standard normal c.d.f.,  and use  the fact that an agent who 
sees  signal x has a posterior  over 0 that is normal with mean  (am0 +  ,3x)/ 
(a  +  8f)  and precision  a +  f3, to get that 
Prob(0 --  *Ix*)  =  ( (Va(i  -am  + 1 
Use  equation  (2) to get 
a +  3  -  a  Va+  -L  (  =  0  -  - 
m,  '- 
(3) 
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and plug this into (1) to get one equation  in the threshold  state  0*: 
(P-  (a0* -  m9)  -  W-  ))=a(*).  (4) 
Equation (3) gives  us the threshold  signal x* at which an agent is indiffer- 
ent between  rioting and not rioting given  threshold  state 0*, and the left- 
hand side of equation  (4) gives  us the fraction of the crowd who  receives 
signals  less than or equal to x*. Any  solutions  to equation  (4) must lie in 
the interval [0, 0]. Both sides of this equation are increasing functions: the 
left-hand  side  looks  like a normal  c.d.f.  with  steepness  determined  by 
a/V-,8  and the right-hand  side has whatever  slope  is assumed  to reflect 
how  the strength  of the police varies with the state. The fact that there is 
at most one solution  when  3 is large relative to a follows  from the fact that 
the left-hand  side becomes  flat in 0 over the interval [0, 0] in the limit as 
a/\/-  goes  to zero.  Note  that if a/V/-  is large, then this equation  typi- 
cally has three solutions  in the interval  [0, 0] (since the c.d.f.  looks more 
like an S over this interval),  and thus the iterated deletion  of dominated 
strategies  does  not pin down  a unique  equilibrium. 
4.  The  Selected  Equilibrium  and  Comparative  Statics 
Consider  now  what  the  unique  equilibrium  outcome  looks  like  as  a 
function  of  the  state  of  nature  0. Note  first that,  whatever  0 is,  some 
portion of the crowd will riot and some portion of the crowd will not. All 
that varies  with  the  state  0 is the  size  of the fraction of the crowd  that 
riots and whether  the rioters overwhelm  the police  or are arrested. 
The  fraction  of  the  crowd  that  riots  in  state  0 is  Prob(x  c  x* 0)  = 
(  (V-(x*  -  0)). This fraction, as a function  of the state 0, is one minus  a 
normal  c.d.f.  and  thus  looks  like a reverse  S-curve.  If the noise  E  has  a 
small variance,  then this fraction begins  to look like a step function: close 
to 1 for 0 <  x* and close to 0 for 0 > x*, with  a steep transition  from high 
to low as 0 crosses the threshold  signal x*. Thus, the equilibrium relation- 
ship  between  the actions  of the crowd  and the strength  of the police  is 
highly  nonlinear.  For large  ranges  of  values  of  the  state  0,  we  have 
changes  in  the  strength  of  the  police,  a(O), but  little  or no  change  in 
the  fraction of the  crowd  that riots.  On  the other hand,  for values  of  0 
close  to the threshold  signal  x*, we  have  a large and sudden  change  in 
the  number  of people  rioting.  This is a very  interesting  result,  since  it 
suggests  that sudden  shifts in agents' expectations  with small changes  in 
the  state  may  play  an  important  role  in  determining  equilibrium  out- 
comes  despite  the fact that the equilibrium is unique. Comment 169 
Now  let us go through  an example  of how  to use this technology  to do 
comparative  statics.  The natural exercise  in this example  is to ask what 
effect changes  in the average strength  of the police  (parametrized by mi) 
have  on  the  equilibrium  incidence  of  riots,  computed  as  the  ex  ante 
probability  that the  state  0 is below  the  threshold  0*, or  P (\a-(0*  - 
mo)). Differentiating  equation  (4) gives  us the  result that as long  as the 
left-hand  side  of  (4) is  flatter in  0 than  the  right-hand  side  (the  same 
condition  that ensures  uniqueness  of  the  solution),  then  dO*/dmo  <  0. 
What  this  implies,  of  course,  is that  strengthening  the  police  has  two 
beneficial  effects: first, it lowers  the probability  that the crowd  will win 
the  riot, holding  fixed  the  threshold  state  0*, and  second,  it leads  to a 
reduction  in the threshold  state 0*, further reducing  the probability that 
the crowd will overwhelm  the police.  Morris and Shin play up this shift 
in the threshold  state in their application  of this technology  to the pricing 
of corporate debt. Note,  of course,  that this second  effect, this shifting of 
the threshold  state,  is smaller, the larger is  8 relative to a. In the limit as 
a/Vr  goes  to zero,  this second  effect disappears. 
5.  The  Problem  with  Introducing  Prices  into  the  Model 
So  far in  our  analysis,  individuals  in  this  crowd  have  no  information 
other than their own  signal to consider when  they decide whether  to riot 
or not.  This would  be different,  of course,  if we introduced  markets and 
prices  into  the  model.  Imagine,  for  the  sake  of  this  discussion,  that 
individuals  also could see asset prices, and assume  specifically that there 
is a traded asset with payout  contingent  on the claims that the insurance 
company  that covers  the  property  threatened  by  the  rioters must  pay. 
For simplicity, assume  that the claims that the insurance company  would 
have to pay following  a riot take on only two values: a large value in the 
event  that  the  crowd  overwhelms  the  police,  and  a small  value  in the 
event  that the  police  keep  the  crowd  under  control.  Imagine,  as well, 
that assets  trade continuously,  so that individuals  in the crowd  can see 
asset prices  after 0 is realized but before they need  to decide  whether  to 
riot. 
On the one hand,  if this asset ends up being priced in equilibrium in a 
way that accurately reflects its subsequent  payout,  it will have one price 
in all states  0 -  0* (reflecting that the insurance  claims will be large) and 
another price in all states  0 >  0* (reflecting that the insurance claims will 
be 0). This, of course,  will be a problem  for our previous  analysis.  Every 
individual  should  be able to look  at this asset  price and know  whether 
the  crowd  is going  to overwhelm  the police  or not.  Depending  on  the 
price, then,  either every individual  should  strictly prefer to riot, or to not 170 *  ATKESON 
riot.  Agents'  actions  and  beliefs  would  be  coordinated,  since  there 
would  be no  reason  for any individual  to act differently  on the basis  of 
his  own  signal.  The logic  of Morris and  Shin's  argument  goes  out  the 
window. 
On the other hand,  if this asset does  not get priced in equilibrium in a 
way  that allows  agents  to infer whether  the crowd  will  overwhelm  the 
police  or not,  we  must ask why  it is not priced that way. How  do we  set 
up the model  so that the asset  price does  not aggregate  the information 
that all of the individuals  in the economy  have  and thus  reveal the true 
state? 
The idea that individuals  in a crowd considering  whether  to riot or not 
would  consult  asset  prices  via  the  newspaper  or their  handy  wireless 
Internet connections  seems  farfetched.  That, in part, was my motivation 
for picking  this example  for my  discussion.  The analysis  of Morris and 
Shin  seems  as  if  it  might  work  pretty  well  for  this  example.  In  the 
macroeconomic  examples  that Morris and Shin point  to in their paper, 
however,  asset prices are clearly a necessary  part of the picture,  and it is 
not at all clear how  their arguments  apply. 
In Morris and Shin's example  regarding speculative  attacks on curren- 
cies,  one  would  think  that forward  exchange  rates (interest-rate  differ- 
entials)  and options  on exchange  rates are readily  observed  by all mar- 
ket  participants  when  they  consider  whether  to  attack  or  not.  Their 
example  in  their  earlier  paper  (Morris  and  Shin,  1988),  like  the  riot 
example  above,  has agents  holding  diverse  beliefs  about the probability 
that  the  currency  will  be  devalued  and  deciding  whether  or  not  to 
attack  on  the  basis  of  those  beliefs.  But,  if,  given  the  fundamentals 
today,  the  equilibrium  uniquely  pins  down  whether  the  currency  will 
soon  be devalued  or not,  then  it seems  that those  interest-rate  differen- 
tials and  exchange-rate  option  prices  should  reflect today  which  of the 
two  outcomes  will  occur.  If  those  prices  do  accurately  reflect  which 
outcome  will occur, agents  should  coordinate  their decision  to attack or 
not  according  to them:  everyone  should  attack if the  asset  prices  indi- 
cate a devaluation  will  occur, and no  one  should  attack if they  indicate 
that a devaluation  will not occur. It does  not make sense  in this applica- 
tion  to assume  that agents  will  take different  actions  (attacking  or not) 
on  the  basis  of  their  private  signals  if publicly  observed  asset  prices 
accurately  reveal  which  outcome  will  actually  occur.  It thus  does  not 
make sense  to apply  the argument  proposed  by Morris and Shin to the 
analysis  of  currency  attacks  unless  we  can  tell  some  story  as  to  why 
interest-rate  differentials  and  exchange-rate  options  do  not  reveal  an 
imminent  devaluation  of  the  currency  even  if  that  devaluation  must 
occur in equilibrium with probability one. Comment 171 
In Morris and Shin's  example  regarding  corporate debt,  discussed  in 
detail in a cited working  paper (Morris and Shin,  1999), the price of the 
firm's equity and the secondary market price of the firm's debt will clearly 
reflect  some  market  assessment  of  the  likelihood  that  the  firm will  be 
liquidated  in equilibrium.  If the outcome,  liquidation  or not,  is uniquely 
pinned  down  by the fundamentals,  then these prices should  reveal that, 
and agents  should  be able to coordinate  their actions  accordingly. 
Finally, in the bank-run  example  presented  in this paper,  the price of 
the bank's equity  should  reveal whether  there will be a run or not,  since 
this outcome  is pinned  down  in equilibrium.  Accordingly,  agents should 
look at this price in deciding  whether  to run or not,  and it seems  natural 
to suspect  that their actions  and beliefs  might  be coordinated  upon  the 
observation  of this price. 
The question  then stands,  how  do we integrate prices into the analysis 
and  yet  preserve  the  diversity  of posterior  beliefs  across  agents  that is 
key  to pinning  down  a unique  equilibrium? Perhaps the answer  to this 
question  will depend  on the specific  application:  it seems  plausible  that 
rioters  are not  integrating  asset  prices  into  their analysis  of whether  to 
riot or not;  it seems  less  plausible  to assume  that currency  traders  are 
ignoring  interest-rate differentials  and option prices in deciding  whether 
to attack a currency or not.  Finding  an answer  to this question  seems  to 
me to be the obvious  next step in refining this potentially  useful  technol- 
ogy for analyzing  macroeconomic  coordination  games. 
Comment1 
HELtNE REY 
London School of Economics  and CEPR 
1.  Introduction 
It is a real pleasure  to  comment  on  a paper  which  is of great interest, 
addresses  a  fundamental  issue  in  macroeconomics,  and  is  also  very 
elegant. 
In a series  of articles,  Steve  Morris and Hyun  Song  Shin have  devel- 
oped  a fruitful  line  of  research  that  extends  and  applies  sophisticated 
game-theoretic  concepts  to traditional macroeconomic  problems.  In this 
paper,  which  may  be  seen  to  some  degree  as  a synthesis  of  their  ap- 
proach,  they  use a simple  bank-run model  as a framework  to ask a very 
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important question: Are multiple equilibria in economics  the unintended 
consequence  of too simplistic  assumptions? 
The answer provided  by the paper is unambiguously  yes.  The authors 
write,  for example:  "We doubt that economic  agents' beliefs  are as inde- 
terminate  as implied  by  the  multiple-equilibrium  models.  Instead,  the 
apparent indeterminacy  of beliefs  can be seen  as the consequence  of two 
modeling  assumptions  introduced  to simplify  the theory. First, the eco- 
nomic  fundamentals  are assumed  to be  common  knowledge;  and  sec- 
ond,  economic  agents  are  assumed  to  be  certain  about  each  other's 
behavior  in equilibrium." The paper then claims that introducing  a small 
amount  of  idiosyncratic  uncertainty  is  enough  to  destroy  the  perfect 
coordination  of agents'  actions and beliefs  and therefore to eliminate  the 
possibility  of multiple  equilibria. Since our world seems  indeed  to be one 
of imperfect  and asymmetric  information,  this realistic generalization  of 
our traditional macroeconomic  models  appears to banish  multiple  equi- 
libria once  and for all. They become  an "artifact of simplifying  assump- 
tions that deliver more than they are intended  to deliver," as the authors 
put it. 
In my discussion,  I will emphasize  that Morris and Shin's paper does 
not  in  fact  eliminate  the  possibility  of  multiple  equilibria.  I will  also 
discuss  the robustness  of their results more precisely  and perform some 
comparative-statics  exercises.  Finally, I will  comment  on  the  empirical 
applicability  of their model  and its relations to the literature on multiple 
equilibria. 
2.  Unique  Equilibrium? 
Morris  and  Shin  set  up  a  Diamond-Dybvig  bank-run  model  with  a 
slightly  more  sophisticated  information  structure  than  usual.  Returns 
follow  a normal distribution  with  a given  precision  a; this is public infor- 
mation. On  the  other  hand,  each  agent  gets  a signal  with  precision  13 
regarding  the  realization  of the return; this is private information.  When 
the  fundamentals  are common  knowledge,  it  is  well  known  that  the 
Diamond-Dybvig  model  gives  rise to multiple  equilibria. By introducing 
a little bit of noise  (a very small degree  of asymmetric  information),  the 
authors  show  that the equilibrium  is unique.  So a very minor modifica- 
tion to an otherwise  standard model  is able to eliminate  the multiplicity 
of equilibria. 
This  is  a very  strong  result.  I will  argue,  however,  that  the  minor 
deviation  from the benchmark model  chosen  by the authors brings with 
it a lot of interesting  and sometimes  puzzling  results,  some  of them not 
emphasized  in the paper. In particular, if one does not look exclusively  at Comment 173 
the  limiting  case  on  which  the  authors  are focusing  but  at the  general 
case of their own  model,  the possibility  for multiple  equilibria reappears 
very naturally. 
In Morris and  Shin's  paper,  the  condition  characterizing  the  equilib- 
rium is 
p* =  0  (V-(p*  -  r)), 
where  p* is the  cutoff  point  below  which  patient  consumers  withdraw 
their  money  from  the  bank,  f  is  the  mean  of  the  returns,  0  (.)  is  the 
cumulative  normal distribution,  and y is a constant given below.  Graphi- 
cally, this equilibrium  is illustrated in Figure 1 of the paper. It is immedi- 
ately  apparent  that the 45? line and the cumulative  normal  distribution 
will intersect  only  once if the slope  of the cumulative  normal is "not too 
steep."  Formally, a sufficient  condition  for this to happen  is 
a  (a  +  3)  y =  27r. 
3 (a  +  213) 
When  the precision  of the private information,  8, is very high  (/3 goes 
to infinity for a given  a, meaning  that y becomes  very small), the authors 
interpret their model  as being  a very  small deviation  from the standard 
Diamond-Dybvig  model  with  common  knowledge.  In  that  case  the 
Morris-Shin  model  gives  the  discontinuity  result  emphasized  in  the 
paper: If private  information  is very  precise,  then  the two  curves  inter- 
sect only  once and we have  a unique  equilibrium.  If, on the other hand, 
private  information  is  infinitely  precise,  then  we  are in  the  standard 
Diamond-Dybvig  case and there are multiple  equilibria. This is an inter- 
esting  and surprising  result,  and the authors  present  it very well  in the 
paper. 
But this is not  the  end  of the story. Note  that there are two  different 
ways  to approach the common  knowledge  case from within  the Morris- 
Shin framework  (Figure 1). We can approach common  knowledge  either 
by letting the precision  of the private signal go to infinity, as in the paper, 
or by letting  the precision  of the public information  go to infinity. In that 
latter case,  a would  be going  to infinity for a given  3 and the slope of the 
cumulative  normal distribution  would  become  very steep  as in Figure 2. 
In that case,  there can be multiple  equilibria. More generally,  it is obvi- 
ous  that as long  as the precision  of the public  information  is high  com- 
pared to that of the private signal,  multiple  equilibria will still exist. This 
result is intuitive:  the more precise  public  information  is,  the closer we 174 *  REY 
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are to the standard case of common  knowledge  among  economic  agents, 
which  is known  to  generate  multiple  equilibria.  At  another  level,  it is 
however  somehow  paradoxical to think that the economies  that are gen- 
erating the more accurate publicly available information are also the ones 
that are the more prone to multiple  equilibria. And,  conversely,  it is also Comment*  175 
puzzling  that  for  a  given  degree  of  precision  of  the  private  signals, 
economies  with  very  diffuse  public  information  will  converge  to  a 
unique  equilibrium. 
To summarize,  the central claim of the paper (the discontinuity  result), 
that  a very  minor  deviation  from  the  standard  models  with  common 
knowledge  is enough  to eliminate  the possibility  of multiple  equilibria, is 
not the whole  story: if one does  accept that the Morris-Shin  framework 
is a better representation  of reality, one has to recognize  that this model 
also  delivers  multiple  equilibria  for some  parameter  domains.  Further- 
more, common  knowledge  can be seen  as a limiting case in two different 
ways:  in one  case,  one  converges  towards  common  knowledge  with  a 
unique  equilibrium,  in the other case,  one  converges  towards  common 
knowledge  with  multiple  equilibria. 
3.  Comparative-Statics  Results  and  Dynamics 
If we  limit ourselves  to the parameter region where  uniqueness  of equi- 
librium  prevails,  we  can  perform  comparative-statics  exercises,  which 
pave the way towards policy recommendations.  A first thing to look at is 
the effect of the precision  of private and public information  on the cutoff 
signal  x* below  which  patient  depositors  will  withdraw  their  money 
from the bank. It turns out that an increase in the precision  of either type 
of information may either lower or raise the value of the critical signal for 
a given  return. This result is puzzling. 
Another  interesting  exercise  is  to  look  at the  impact  of  a change  in 
public information  versus  the impact of a change  in private information. 
One  can even  characterize by how  much a private signal should  change 
to  balance  the  impact  of  a  change  in  public  information  so  that  the 
strategies  of the agents are kept unchanged.  Since one of the key aspects 
of public information in Morris and Shin's paper is that it coordinates  the 
expectations  of agents,  one would  expect that public news  would  have a 
bigger relative effect than private news.  This intuition is correct provided 
one  is able to control for the relative precision  of the private and public 
informations,  which  requires knowing  the magnitudes  of a and  3. 
The  model  presented  is  a  one-shot  game  (a repetition  of  one-shot 
games  in the second  part of the paper).  It would  obviously  be very nice 
to  do  a dynamic  extension  of  the  framework.  Careful  thought  should 
then  be  given  to the  process  of information  revelation.  Let us  imagine 
that economic  agents  play the game presented  in the paper at date t. At 
date t +  1, they will have  observed  the number  of people  having  run on 
the bank at date t, which  is given  by 176 *  REY 
e(r) =  -  )(p- (  ( (p-  ) )  . 
As soon  as the proportion  of people  withdrawing  money  is observed, 
the  realized  return  becomes  common  knowledge,  since  all  the  other 
parameters  are known.  If there  is some  persistence  in the  return vari- 
able, then the precision  of the public information  is increasing  over time 
(a is increasing  for a given  3), and we  may exit the unique  equilibrium 
region.  Extending  the  model  dynamically  therefore  requires  keeping 
enough  "fuzziness"  in the public information. 
4.  Empirical  Applicability 
An  interesting  feature  of  Morris  and  Shin's  approach  is  the  ability  to 
address  policy  issues,  thanks  to  the  comparative-statics  exercises  per- 
formed around the unique equilibrium. For practical purposes,  it is there- 
fore very  important  to know  whether  the  economy  is in a unique-  or a 
multiple-equilibrium  region,  which  depends  on the value of the parame- 
ter y. Since  y is not homogeneous  in  a and  13,  figuring  out the relative 
precision  of  the  two  types  of  information  is  not  enough.  It  matters 
whether  a is  17 rather than  13 or whether  8 is 9 rather than  10. More- 
over, just like the number of equilibria themselves,  we have seen that the 
comparative-statics  results  depend  on  the  absolute  magnitude  of  the 
precision  of  the  public  and  the  private  information.  Unfortunately,  it 
seems  extremely  difficult  to  get  an idea  of what  these  numbers  are in 
reality. They  partly depend  on  the  interpretation  one  has  of the  model 
itself.  Should  we  think of the private-information  element  of the model 
as differences  in psychology  across individuals,  so that traders reading 
the  same  economic  news  may  form  different  views  on  the  economy 
depending  on their temperament?  Or should  we think of it as the degree 
of precision  of "inside information"? 
This  aspect  put  aside,  we  should  ask ourselves  whether  Morris and 
Shin's  approach  has  empirical  implications  which  can clearly be distin- 
guished  from  those  of  the  models  exhibiting  multiple  equilibria.  The 
authors  argue  that their model  provides  testable  implications  so that it 
suggests  a  correlation  between  fundamentals  and  outcomes,  unlike 
multiple-equilibrium  models,  where  the  shift  from  one  equilibrium  to 
the other may be due  to pure sunspots.  This point  is interesting.  Note, 
however,  that  multiple-equilibrium  models  also  provide  some  correla- 
tions  between  fundamentals  and  outcomes.  In a self-fulfilling  specula- Comment  -177 
tive-attack model,  for example,  the parameter space is divided  into three 
regions:  one  where  the  fundamentals  are so  good  that there can be no 
attack, one where  the fundamentals  are so bad that there is an attack for 
sure,  and an intermediate  region where  there are multiple  equilibria. 
Therefore  I would  argue  that  the  key  empirical  implication  of  the 
Morris-Shin  model  is  not  that  fundamentals  are correlated  with  out- 
comes,  nor that multiple  equilibria do not  exist-as  discussed  above- 
but  rather that the  degree  of information  aggregation  matters.  Having 
recognized  this fact, there  are nice natural experiments  which  could  be 
used  to test the model.  One could for example look at the role of polls or 
surveys  in  a  situation  with  strategic  complementarities  (like  foreign- 
exchange  traders). One  could  also study  the impact  of the introduction 
of a futures  market on the  evolution  of spot  prices,  the idea being  that 
prices  of  futures  would  aggregate  the  information  of  market  partic- 
ipants.  The difficulty  of putting  numbers  on the precisions  of public and 
private  information  and  therefore  of  pinning  down  the  exact  implica- 
tions  of the  model-which  vary  across  parameter  regions-will,  how- 
ever, remain. 
5.  Interpretation  of  Multiple  Equilibria 
The  main  message  of  multiple-equilibrium  models  may  be  that  even 
when  the fundamentals  of the economy  are almost  the same,  outcomes 
can be very different.  The sense  of this basic message  seems  empirically 
quite relevant.  The ERM crisis of 1992, for example,  has often been given 
as an example  of self-fulfilling  speculative  attack. By fundamentals  we 
usually  mean  all  the  variables  describing  the  economy  (GDP, prices, 
exchange  rates, etc.)  except  the information  structure. A great virtue of 
the  Morris-Shin  model  is  that  it introduces  the  information  structure 
into the set of the fundamental  variables.  The question  is then whether 
the  model  can  deliver  the  flavor  of  the  multiple-equilibrium  models 
while  keeping  the uniqueness  of the equilibrium. 
The paper  shows  that for some  parameter  values,  introducing  some 
noise  makes  the  equilibrium  unique.  In that  uniqueness  region,  small 
changes  in the information  structure do change  the threshold  value be- 
low  which  an  attack  occurs,  but  not  dramatically  so  (in  general).  In 
Figure 1 of the paper, for example,  one can see that a small change in the 
information  structure (or in the mean return) will change the slope of the 
normal distribution  (or shift it, respectively).  But this will not result in a 
big variation in p*, the posterior belief below  which  the patient consum- 
ers withdraw  their money,  unless  the slope  of the normal distribution  is 178 - REY 
quite  steep,  which  is exactly  the  case  when  one  is close  to  the  region 
where  multiple  equilibria exist.  In other words,  the Morris-Shin  model 
can  have  the  flavor  of  multiple-equilibrium  models,  but  that  is  only 
provided  one  is in a parameter region  away  from the limit case consid- 
ered by the authors  and close  to the multiplicity  domain. 
In the absence  of even  more sophisticated  ways  to model  information 
aggregation  and  the  endogeneity  of  the  information  structure,  we  are 
still left with  a multiple-equilibrium  region  where  we  cannot  say much 
about equilibrium  selection.  Perhaps  a phenomenon  like the  1992 ERM 
crisis could be modeled  as unique  equilibrium  if dramatic shifts in infor- 
mation aggregation  were incorporated  explicitly. One way forward could 
be to think harder about the information  aggregation  process: here pri- 
vate  information  is costless  to acquire and  is automatically  given  to all 
agents.  Costly  and voluntary  information  acquisition  should  ideally  be 
related to the other fundamentals  of the economy. 
6.  Conclusion 
The paper makes a very important contribution to the literature on strate- 
gic complementarities.  First, Morris and Shin's approach  can be applied 
to  a wide  spectrum  of  issues.  We have  many  macroeconomic  models 
which  exhibit multiple  equilibria, whether  they are used  to discuss  bank 
runs,  speculative  attacks,  industrialization,  inflation,  poverty  traps,  or 
thick-market externalities.  As the authors point out, this multiplicity  is a 
problem  if one  wants  to perform  comparative-statics  exercises.  What is 
the  impact  of increasing  a tax rate,  for example,  when  the  system  can 
switch  from one equilibrium  to another in a random  fashion? Determin- 
ing the equilibrium  to which  an economic  system  will converge  is a key 
issue  for policy  makers,  and  this  is  where  the  Morris  and  Shin's  ap- 
proach is so valuable.  But as I have pointed  out,  the Morris-Shin  model 
is not  as  opposed  to  the  multiple-equilibrium  literature as the  authors 
claim. This is not a criticism, and it underlines  that the model  has many 
interesting  and rich features,  which  can be exploited  further. The model 
is not very operational yet as far as empirical tests are concerned,  mainly 
because  it is  hard  to  pin  down  the  magnitude  of  the  key  parameters 
which  determine  the  domain  of  existence  of  equilibria  as  well  as  the 
comparative-statics  results.  It also lacks true dynamics.  The Morris-Shin 
framework  has  however  already  been  (rightly)  very  influential  in  the 
way we think about coordination  and information  aggregation  in macro- 
economic  models  and  will  certainly  generate  a lot  of  interesting  new 
results in very diverse  areas. Discussion  *  179 
Discussion 
In responding  to the discussants'  comments,  Stephen  Morris agreed that 
there are two  ways  of proving  the existence  of a unique  equilibrium  in 
their  framework.  The  first,  employed  in  their  paper,  is  the  direct  ap- 
proach of showing  that no equilibrium  other than the one they find can 
exist. The other approach is discussant  Andrew  Atkeson's  iterated elimi- 
nation  of  dominated  strategies.  Morris noted  that Atkeson's  approach 
makes  the equilibrium  a little less  mysterious  but may give  the impres- 
sion that agents  in the model  need  to do sophisticated  reasoning,  which 
is not the case,  as no other threshold  will work as an equilibrium.  Morris 
agreed  with  the discussant  Helene  Rey that the implications  of alterna- 
tive assumptions  on the information  structure, especially  the distinction 
between  public and private information,  are the most important  area of 
future research.  On the importance  of public information,  he attributed 
to Robert Shiller the  claim that "bubbles  started  when  newspapers  be- 
came widely  available." The importance of financial news  networks  of all 
kinds  is  not  only  that  an  individual  receives  information,  but  that  he 
knows  that others  are also receiving  that information. 
Daron Acemoglu  began  the general discussion  by suggesting  that one 
way  of interpreting  multiple-equilibrium  results  is that they  arise from 
sparse  formal models  with  limited  fundamentals.  The fact that models 
with  few  fundamentals  imply  multiple  equilibria does  not imply  neces- 
sarily that multiple equilibria are a feature of the real world.  The virtue of 
this paper is that it suggests  that minimal  increases  in the complexity  of 
our models  may reduce  or eliminate  multiple  equilibria. Acemoglu  also 
offered an intuition  about why  the model  works: In discrete choice mod- 
els there are multiple equilibria because when  everybody  else does some- 
thing the return is sufficiently  high,  and when  everybody  else doesn't  do 
something  the return is sufficiently  low, so that "following  the crowd" is 
a winning  strategy for everyone.  Noise  creates a thick tail of people  who 
will  always  do  or not  do  something  independently  of  others'  actions, 
leading  ultimately  to a unique  equilibrium.  This reasoning  suggests  why 
we want  the parameter  3 to be large but not a, because  when  a is large, 
tails are not thick enough  relative to common  information.  The authors 
agreed with  this intuition. 
Mike Woodford  argued against making  the inference  that any finding 
of  multiple  equilibria  depends  on  extreme  assumptions.  He  said  the 
paper does  not show  that multiple-equilibrium  models  are not robust; it 
only  shows  that one  can construct  examples  with  private signals  where 
there is a unique  equilibrium.  Woodford suggested  that minor perturba- 180 *  DISCUSSION 
tions of private-information  models  will yield multiple equilibria that are 
qualitatively  similar to those in common-knowledge  models; hence  Mor- 
ris  and  Shin's  analysis  does  not  demonstrate  that  the  conclusions  of 
models  without  private  signals  are not  robust.  Woodford  also  thought 
the authors overstressed  the finding  that, in their model,  a small change 
in the public  signal  can have  a large effect on the equilibrium  outcome, 
even  though  the  equilibrium  is  unique.  He  observed  that  this  result 
requires the parameter  y to be large, which  means  that the model  is very 
close  to one  with  multiple  equilibria,  implying  in turn that the  unique 
equilibrium  is very  fragile.  Fundamentally,  then,  the  mechanisms  that 
generate  big swings  are similar in this model  and in models  exhibiting 
multiple  equilibria. 
The authors  agreed  with  Woodford  that there are many  ways  to per- 
turb the  common-knowledge  model  that  preserve  multiple  equilibria. 
However,  Shin argued that their model  is special (and not a small pertur- 
bation)  in its  result  that people  remain  uncertain  in equilibrium  about 
the  actions  of  others,  so  that  common  knowledge  is  destroyed.  Shin 
suggested  that their model  should  be viewed  as a cousin  of the "second- 
generation"  models,  which  preserves  the  flavor  of  those  models  but 
includes  a rigorous  equilibrium  argument  that pins  down  the  model's 
prediction.  Morris added  that finding  out under what information  struc- 
tures  equilibrium  is unique  is a worthwhile  project in itself.  He  noted 
that models  with  strategic complementarities  will already have  a strong 
multiplier effect, so that interpreting a crisis as a switch from one equilib- 
rium to another amounts  to throwing  in an extra, and perhaps  unneces- 
sary,  strategic  complementarity.  Their  approach  eliminates  this  extra 
degree  of freedom. 
Pierre Gourinchas  suggested  that in multiperiod  models  there might 
be  a feedback  process:  agents  may  observe  fundamentals  and  get very 
precise  information.  Asset  prices  that efficiently  aggregate  information 
may  have  the  same  effect.  If precise  information  on  fundamentals  be- 
comes  publicly  available, the results  of the paper are undermined.  Mor- 
ris agreed  there  would  be  progressive  information  revelation  through 
prices  in  a dynamic  model;  he  thought  a useful  direction  would  be  to 
write  down  a more  complicated  model  in  which  this  happens,  but  in 
which  people  also receive private information  over time. 
Paolo Pesenti was enthusiastic  about the approach, arguing that it repre- 
sents  the best chance  so far to build the foundations  of a theory of confi- 
dence  crises.  Such a theory  would  have  far-reaching implications  about 
how  we  think  about  financial  stability  and  other  important  issues.  He 
hoped  that this approach  would  eliminate  the current dichotomy  in the Discussion 181 
literature  between  fundamentals-based  and  non-fundamentals-based 
models  of crises. 
Ken  Rogoff  recalled  that,  in  his  Ely  lecture,  Larry Summers  com- 
plained  about models  of crises that have  the implication  that, in certain 
regions,  economics  can say nothing.  Summers  called  for a model  with 
the feature that the worse  the fundamentals  are, the more likely a crisis. 
Rogoff  noted  that,  at a formal  level,  the  Morris-Shin  model  has  this 
desirable  property. But, he  asked,  suppose  we  establish  at a theoretical 
level  that equilibrium  is unique  but can't connect  it to any fundamental 
that we can plausibly  observe.  Then would  our empirical approach be in 
any way different,  relative to the case in which we are guided  by models 
with  multiple  equilibria? 